Last year, Hassan Nasrallah was unwilling to go to war with Israel. The Hezbollah leader believed he was lured into this by Yahya Shinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, who refused to consult his allies before his men attacked Israel on October 7. But his rhetoric didn’t leave him many options. Almost a year later, that decision would cost him his life.
His murder on September 27 was one of the highlights of a remarkable year.
The worst massacre in Israel’s history led to the deadliest war in Palestinian history, Iran’s first direct attacks on Israel and even the first time in a war that missiles were intercepted in space. None of this would have happened without Sinuar’s fateful decision last October. This is not to say that the region would be at peace – but this specific sequence of events would be unthinkable if Hamas had not killed more than 1,100 Israelis. Sinouar wanted a cataclysmic war that would reshape the Middle East, and he succeeded.
In many ways, it didn’t go according to plan. Gaza is devastated. Hamas is broken. Hezbollah has lost its leader, its military command and its reputation for competence, while Iran feels vulnerable. There were almost no protests in the Arab world. No regime has fallen, faltered or cut ties with Israel. Even the economic consequences were limited. The price of Brent crude oil is 10 dollars lower than the day before Hamas attacked Israel.
Sinwar went to war with two assumptions: that he would enjoy the support of a strong and united “axis of resistance” and that Israel’s behavior would mobilize the region. These beliefs were shared by many Arab, Israeli and Western authorities.
However, when it came time to test the idea, Nasrallah hesitated. The vast majority of Lebanese, including around 50% of their Shiite voters, opposed the war to support Gaza.
His Iranian patrons weren’t thrilled either. Hezbollah’s arsenal had to be preserved as a shield against a possible Israeli attack – they did not want to put that arsenal at risk to protect Hamas.
The Houthis in Yemen were more willing to join the fight, but they had their own limitation: distance.
They can only hit Israel directly with a small arsenal of missiles and slow drones with a range of 2,000 kilometers. In some cases, these can become lethal. But they are not enough to affect the course of a war.
In neighboring Syria, Bashar al-Assad maintained a suspicious silence last month as Israel attacked Hezbollah. It took two days after Nasrallah’s assassination for him to issue a tepid condolence.
Iran and its proxies were victims of their own campaign. Despite talking about unity, the “axis of resistance” is a network of disparate militias. The passage of time has shown that they do not share the same interests and that many of them have limited capacity to work in failed or failed states.
This leaves Iran in an uncomfortable position. The militias should fight on their behalf – allowing Iran to stay out of direct conflict with Israel. However, the Islamic Republic now feels compelled to fire ballistic missiles at Israel in retaliation for attacks on these militias, a step that will certainly provoke Israeli retaliation. His shield turned into a burden.