Last month, as tensions between Iran and Israel rose, China held a five-day film festival in Tehran. It opened with a blockbuster: “The Battle at Lake Changjin”. The drama depicts the heroism of Chinese soldiers who fought against US troops in the 1950-53 Korean War.
“Throw one punch to avoid 100,” Mao Zedong is shown exhorting his colleagues. Nationalist bloggers in China were commenting. “Iran cannot sit idly by, even if the United States is behind Israel!” wrote a popular account. This does not mean that Chinese authorities agree, highlights the Economist in its analysis.
Iran launched a missile barrage against Israel on October 1. Since then, Israel has relentlessly attacked Iran’s proxies in Gaza and Lebanon. All of this troubles China, which is by far the most powerful of the four countries that many in the West group together despite their vast differences. The other three are Iran, Russia and North Korea. Some call them the “axis of upheaval” and others the “quartet of chaos.” What do they have in common? They challenge the US-led world order. The relationship between them is often dubious. But China has a huge difference in relation to the other 3. It doesn’t want conflict, it wants influence and economic expansion.
China’s relationship with Iran reveals its dilemma. Leaders in Beijing are sympathetic to Iran’s worldview. Last year, Tehran became a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a Eurasian economic and security club dominated by China and Russia. In January, Iran was also admitted to the BRICS, another group promoted as a bastion of skepticism towards the West.
China also benefits from Iran’s abundant oil supplies. The volume of this trade is difficult to quantify due to the complex schemes used by both sides to avoid US sanctions. However, estimates place them at 10-15% of China’s crude oil imports. This is the majority of Iran’s exports.
As the world’s largest buyer of foreign oil, China is concerned about the potential impact of a wider war in the Middle East on crude oil flows and prices. Iran sells its oil cheap. An Israeli attack on Iranian oil facilities could force China to become more dependent on other, more expensive suppliers, such as Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, even Saudi missions could be disrupted in the Strait of Hormuz or the Red Sea by missile attacks.
This may not be disastrous for China. It is believed to have reserves that would cover three or four months of lost imports. And oil makes up 18% of China’s energy supply, compared to 34% in America. But a major war in the Middle East could threaten China’s commercial interests in the region. It has invested billions of dollars in energy and infrastructure projects, especially in Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Israel also receives Chinese investment (despite China’s long-standing support for the Palestinian issue).
China’s big moment in the Middle East?
China sees American power in the Middle East waning and feels it has an opportunity. It has established close ties with Iran, but also with Saudi Arabia and other rivals of Tehran in the region. Its main investments in the region are part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a global infrastructure-building program aimed at boosting Chinese trade and influence. China does not interfere politically in the countries where it invests and this gives it important points. He is eager to cultivate this image among countries in the global South, which he sees as a counterbalance to America.
But as the Middle East threatens to descend into chaos, all of the above is at stake. Beijing’s objective is to prove that it can also work at the level of diplomacy, filling the American gap. In March last year, he mediated the final stages of a deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia to restore their long-severed diplomatic ties. In July, rival Palestinian factions Fatah and Hamas announced a vague agreement in Beijing to work together to form a new government for the Palestinians when the war in Gaza ends.
However, these measures failed to put an end to the violence. Israel rejected the “Beijing Declaration” – it does not want any role for Hamas in the Palestinian territories.
However, there is also something that serves China. America’s mandatory involvement. As long as the US is concerned about developments in the Middle East and Ukraine, it will have little appetite for direct conflict with China. This does not mean that Xi Jinping wants to light the fuse of an Iran-Israel war. He knows that in this case he could also get burned.