Lebanon and the world woke up to the news that Israel had launched a ground invasion in the south, something that Israeli authorities made clear through official statements was largely inevitable. The fear is that the “targeted business» will evolve into something much broader with terrible consequences for an already wounded country and for the entire Middle East.
History shows that it is easy for Israeli troops to enter Lebanon, but difficult to leave. And geopolitical balances testify that Iran cannot remain a mere observer.
For nearly a year, as Hezbollah carried out almost daily cross-border attacks against Israel, many outside the terrorist group’s base feared that the country was being drawn into a conflict it did not choose. State within a state, the most heavily armed militia in the world – a force stronger than the Lebanese army and a political movement with representation in parliament and social influence, the organization that Hassan Nasrallah created had a fervent following but also caused growing discomfort and fear largely. part of public opinion in Lebanon and Iran. Now Nasrallah is dead and his leadership team decimated. But, as an analyst on CNN recently commented, “every time you cut off a head, many grow back.”
Lebanese authorities have little say in their actions. And there is a growing sense that the group is more interested in defending its own interests, and those of its main backer, Iran, than the people. There is anger toward Israel over the deadly airstrikes, but in many cases it is mixed with resentment over the suffering caused by Hezbollah.
Up to a million people have already been displaced and more than 1,000 have been killed in the past two weeks. As the conflict escalates, an already exhausted country plunges into an even deeper crisis.
What will Iran’s reaction be?
When the Israeli bomb killed Hassan Nasrallah, it didn’t just decapitate a fearsome militia that drove around 60,000 Israelis from their homes with frequent rocket attacks. He has dealt a very powerful blow to Iran’s so-called “axis of resistance.” It is a humiliating development for Tehran. And a development that, the Economist warns, could push it toward its other main form of deterrence: its nuclear weapons program.
In recent days, amid Israeli attacks on Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis, Iranian authorities have hinted that Israel’s belligerence could lead Iran to develop nuclear weapons. The regime is rapidly expanding uranium enrichment. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme religious leader and the man who makes all critical decisions, may decide that the only way to protect his regime, which is despised by its own citizens and vulnerable to Israeli attack, would be to develop nuclear weapons.
The United States and Israel have long declared that Iran will not be allowed to build a bomb. Israel, in particular, appears to have detailed information about the progress of Iran’s nuclear program. Therefore, if there are indications that Tehran is overstepping certain limits, it could very well attack Iranian nuclear facilities – something it came very close to doing in 2011. But there are no guarantees that this will be successful. As the Economist points out, the Israelis, in their most honest moments, recognize that the opportunity to significantly roll back Iran’s nuclear program with airstrikes may have passed: the relevant facilities are too buried and nuclear know-how too dispersed. Bombing the facilities would fan the flames raging across the Middle East while delaying Iran’s program by just a few months, some experts say.
Tehran’s weaknesses
Iran could build a weapon completely covertly, assuming that deterrence would still be achieved because foreign intelligence would have some idea what it was. But it may want to make its intentions clearer by expelling international inspectors, withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and renouncing the fatwa prohibiting nuclear development. Or it could carry out a nuclear test, demonstrating its capabilities to the world but also causing international outrage.
Iran’s big problem is that it does not have clear protectors: it is not certain that Russia will intervene to save the regime. A second option would be to imitate India. This would entail building a larger, although still modest, arsenal that could survive the enemy’s first attack, allowing for subsequent retaliations. A decade ago, many experts and officials believed that the Indian option was the most likely path forward for Iran. It would appeal to Iran’s leaders, who could maintain tight arms control – as they have with chemical weapons in the past – rather than handing over the authority to use them to commanders in the field. In recent years, however, Iran’s calculations may have changed. The military gap with Israel appears to have widened. Worse still, the regime is more vulnerable internally, with dissent growing.
