Maybe all the lights are on at your provocative party Recep Tayyip Erdogan in occupied northern Nicosia on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the invasion of Cyprusbut it seems that the Turkish President is concerned with much broader issues than the Cypriot.
Within two weeks, Erdogan attended first the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting in Astana and then the NATO summit in Washington.
In Washington, Erdogan made it clear that the Peru rejects escalation against Russia. “The prospect of a direct conflict between the NATO and Russia is worrying,” said the Turkish President.
A few days earlier, Erdogan was in Astana for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting and was warmly welcomed. He met with Russian President Vladimir Putinas well as with the Chinese President, Xi Jinpingand both pledged to further strengthen ties with Turkey.
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan was in Turkey last month China to talk about Turkey’s possible accession to the BRICS countries.
After all, trade between Turkey and the SCO countries is growing rapidly. This is largely due to the sanctions imposed by the West on many SCO countries. Of course, the EU is by far Ankara’s most important trading partner, accounting for almost a third of its trade. By contrast, Turkey accounts for 3.6% of the EU’s total trade, but Russia supplies Turkey with almost half of its natural gas needs and a quarter of its oil imports.
China’s window to the EU
Turkey has a customs union with the EU, making it an attractive destination for avoiding tariffs or sanctions. For example, BYD, China’s largest electric vehicle manufacturer, has announced a $1 billion deal to build a factory in Turkey as part of its overseas expansion, with a production capacity of 150,000 vehicles per year. The investment is expected to create around 5,000 new jobs, with production expected to begin by the end of 2026. The factory is expected to attract more Chinese investment.
BYD’s motivation appears to be to circumvent potential EU trade tariffs by making use of the Customs Union with Turkey.
Ahead of the SCO summit, Turkish TV channel TRT World highlighted that Turkish exports to SCO countries have increased by 85% over the past five years – from $14.1 billion in 2019 to $26.1 billion in 2023.
The same applies to Turkish imports: Turkey’s imports from SCO member countries also reached $106.3 billion last year, almost double the $55.6 billion in 2019.
The share of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization countries in Turkey’s total exports last year was still only 10%.
Chinese investments
Ankara is making intensive efforts to attract foreign investment at a time when the Turkish economy is facing serious problems. This is where China comes into play with its vast economic resources.
Turkey’s favorable geographical position could transform the country into a “production hub” focused – at least for now – on duty-free exports to European countries.
However, China still has a long way to go: in 2022, Chinese direct investment in Turkey reached $1.7 billion. So far, the EU still accounts for 59% of foreign direct investment in Turkey.
Race for nuclear power plants
However, Turkey continues negotiations with Russia for a second nuclear power plant after Akuyu, and with China for a third.
Russian nuclear energy company Rosatom financed and built the Akuyu power plant, which, when fully operational, will meet about 10 percent of Turkey’s energy needs. However, due to US sanctions, the Russians have recently faced delays.
At the same time, the US is expected to put more pressure on Ankara to comply with Washington’s directives.
The situation is precarious because NATO would probably not tolerate Turkey being a member of the SCO.
In addition, the US House of Representatives is promoting a bill that would require the US government to sanction Rosatom and its subsidiaries, as well as anyone involved in significant transactions with Rosatom. This would have a significant impact on Turkey’s first and so far only nuclear power plant.
Distances from the USA
At the same time, the US is trying to pressure Turkey to conclude contracts with American companies, although there are several problems with this.
Moreover, US nuclear technology would hardly reduce Turkey’s dependence on nuclear fuel from Russia or China. The change in Turkey’s position is likely to unsettle Washington.
A search of the US Treasury website shows a whopping 259 sanctions against Turkish individuals or entities. This does not reflect well on relations within NATO, at a time when Turkey is experiencing its worst economic crisis in two decades. But there is no guarantee that Turkey will remain an unconditional NATO member forever. Unless, with Trump’s expected arrival in the White House and his good relationship with Erdogan, the Turkish pendulum swings again.
Interestingly, however, China has also recently begun to consider defense cooperation with Turkey.
At the same time – as polls show – the Turkish public has now turned away from the EU and the US and is looking more East:
A 2022 poll conducted by Turkish firm Gezici found that 72.8% of respondents support good relations with Russia. But nearly 90% see the United States as an enemy country.
Recent Pew Research Center polls to mark NATO’s 75th anniversary do not paint such a bleak picture, but Turks still have the second-lowest approval rating of the alliance among members, at just 42 percent.